Liberia’s labour architecture stands on two main pillars. In the private (and broader non-civil-service public) sphere, the Decent Work Act (DWA) sets out modern minimum standards on wages, hours, dignity at work, and social dialogue. In the core public service, day-to-day employment is governed by the Civil Service Agency (CSA) framework and its Standing Orders. By design, these regimes are adjacent rather than identical: the DWA expressly carves out work that falls under the Civil Service Agency Act, while the Standing Orders operationalise the employment relationship for government officials and employees. That separation has value—public administration does carry unique constraints—but it also creates practical gaps and frictions that ultimately affect the same national labour force.

A starting point is scope and clarity. The DWA’s default position is expansive—covering “all work” in Liberia—before it narrows to exclude work governed by the CSA Act. This makes sense in statute, yet in practice it leaves civil servants without direct access to several of the DWA’s clearest guardrails (for example, on payslips, deductions, and posting of wage rates), unless mirrored in CSA instruments. The Standing Orders, for their part, specify who is covered and who is exempt within the civil service, delineate appointment pathways, and situate authority with the Director-General and appointing agencies. But they are variably granular: some areas are prescriptive (attendance, lateness consequences), while others are silent where the DWA is precise (wage statements; deduction caps).

That divergence is most visible in minimum standards. The DWA codifies a national floor for wages, mandates that employers maintain wage records for five years, requires regular pay intervals, and obliges a written pay statement that itemises gross pay, each deduction with reasons, and net pay. It also restricts deductions (for instance, capping voluntary deductions and limiting what can be deducted at all), and it prohibits employer-levied fines unless authorised by statute or a collective agreement. By contrast, the Standing Orders clearly lay out working hours, attendance reporting, and leave categories, yet they also authorise loss of pay for certain infractions (e.g., repeated lateness) and contemplate “reduction in salary” as a disciplinary outcome. In a private-sector setting, such sanctions would be tightly constrained by the DWA’s deduction rules; in the civil service, the carve-out means those DWA protections do not automatically apply—raising risks of inconsistent, opaque, or punitive payroll practices that would not pass muster elsewhere in the economy.

Freedom of association and industrial action present a second, sensitive fault line. The DWA protects union access, permits deduction of union dues under clear authorisations, and—subject to procedures—recognises the legality of certain strikes and lockouts. Within the civil service tradition, however, the norm has long been to prohibit strikes outright for public servants, anchored in continuity of essential services and public order. Internal reviews of the CSA policy set point to this tension directly: they note the DWA’s more balanced approach to strikes, and they urge careful legal redrafting for the public sector instead of blanket prohibitions that can collide with modern labour standards. Without a tailored public-sector collective bargaining and dispute-resolution pathway, the civil service risks staying stuck between an absolute ban and an unworkable import of private-sector rules—neither of which is sustainable.

Discipline and due process are a third area where harmonisation would boost fairness and legitimacy. The Standing Orders map out disciplinary grounds, a progression of warnings, suspension, dismissal, and appeal channels (including an Examining Committee and Board of Appeal with defined timelines). That architecture is valuable. But practice guidance in recent internal assessments recommends a crucial refinement: treat investigative suspensions as administrative leave with pay until findings are made. Unpaid suspensions function as a de facto penalty and invite disputes; paid status preserves the presumption of innocence and reduces litigation exposure. Documentation norms also need tightening: even “verbal” warnings should be formally recorded to create an auditable trail that protects both the institution and the employee.

On dignity at work, the DWA is unambiguous. It bans discrimination, defines and prohibits sexual harassment, and protects workers living with HIV/AIDS from exclusion, testing, or forced disclosure. Those standards reflect modern ILO-aligned best practice. The CSA framework would benefit from making those protections equally explicit—embedding definitions, reporting pathways (including whistleblowing channels), and independent handling of sensitive cases. Establishing a Diversity & Inclusion function with remit over disability, HIV, gender, and culture would institutionalise this alignment and open doors to technical support from partners.

Transparency and record-keeping round out the picture. The DWA requires employers to post wage rates and working hours and to issue itemised payslips; the Standing Orders emphasise attendance reporting and centralised salary administration. Bridging these approaches is straightforward and high-impact: standardise payslip content across government, publish working hours and wage scales prominently, and digitise core HR records with retention rules that mirror (or exceed) the DWA’s five-year requirement. These are low-controversy improvements that raise trust, reduce disputes, and make audits easier.

Comparative perspective: how harmonised models work elsewhere

Several African jurisdictions show how to harmonise a general labour code with a dedicated civil-service regime:

• Ghana uses a single Labour Act to set baseline working conditions across the economy, while the Civil Service Act establishes the structure, appointments, discipline, and management of the civil service. In practice, the Labour Act supplies the floor (e.g., contracts, leave, basic conditions), and the Civil Service Act governs recruitment, promotion, and disciplinary machinery. This model resembles Liberia’s intent but relies on consistent cross-referencing and modernised service rules.
• Nigeria pairs a national Labour Act (which defines minimum terms and regulates wages and deductions) with binding Public Service Rules for federal public servants. The labour statute sets broad minima; the Public Service Rules handle entry, conduct, and discipline. Harmonisation comes from aligning disciplinary outcomes (e.g., suspension, surcharges) with wage-protection limits in the Labour Act, and from central HR authorities policing compliance across ministries.
• Kenya operates a comprehensive Employment Act that applies to virtually all employees, including those in the public service, alongside a Public Service Commission Act that sets the constitutional framework for appointments, performance, and discipline. The PSC issues circulars and codes that must still respect Employment Act minima (e.g., leave entitlements, termination fairness). The result is a two-tier system in which sector-specific rules sit on top of universal labour standards.
• South Africa maintains a robust general regime via the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (and complementary statutes like the Labour Relations Act), while the Public Service Act regulates the organisation, appointments, and conditions of public servants. Public-sector collective bargaining occurs through designated councils, and public servants benefit from the same statutory minima (hours, leave, overtime rules) unless specific exclusions are set for uniformed services. This is a mature “single floor, specialised roof” structure that Liberia can emulate.

Across these systems, the common threads are clear: (1) a single statutory floor for minimum conditions applicable to both private and public workers (with narrow, explicit carve-outs), (2) a distinct civil-service statute that governs merit-based entry, ethics, and discipline, and (3) institutional bridges (public service commissions, central HR authorities, bargaining councils) that keep the two regimes aligned in practice.

Conclusion

Liberia doesn’t need to erase the line between public administration and private employment; it needs to make that line fair and predictable. The fastest wins are administrative: convert investigative suspensions to paid status pending outcome; standardise itemised payslips and record-keeping; and require that any salary impact in the civil service rests on clear legal authority and due process. The bigger prize is structural: adopt a formal concordance between the DWA and the Standing Orders, modernise public-sector dispute resolution around a narrowly tailored essential-services doctrine, and create a CSA–MoL working group to keep the systems in sync. Done well, harmonisation won’t just prevent disputes; it will raise morale, strengthen public trust, and make “decent work” a reality on both sides of the ministerial gate.

References (laws & official guidance)

Liberia (uploaded primary sources)

• Decent Work Act of 2015 (Ministry of Labour): purposes; institutions; fundamental rights; working hours/breaks; wages and records; strikes/lockouts. Decent Work Act-July-6-2015-MOL… Decent Work Act-July-6-2015-MOL… Decent Work Act-July-6-2015-MOL… Decent Work Act-July-6-2015-MOL…
• Decent Work Act of 2015: National Tripartite Council; Minimum Wage Board. Decent Work Act-July-6-2015-MOL… Decent Work Act-July-6-2015-MOL… Decent Work Act-July-6-2015-MOL… Decent Work Act-July-6-2015-MOL…
• Standing Orders for the Civil Service (2012): appointments; scope; discipline; attendance/salaries; sexual-harassment chapter. Standing Orders for the Civil … Standing Orders for the Civil … Standing Orders for the Civil … Standing Orders for the Civil … Standing Orders for the Civil …
• Review of the Standing Orders (Aug. 16, 2021): documentation of verbal warnings; paid investigative suspension; redundancy, pay structure, and maternity policy notes. Review of the Standing Order Au… Review of the Standing Order Au… Review of the Standing Order Au… Review of the Standing Order Au…

Comparative models (official/public sources)

• Ghana — Labour Act 2003 (Act 651); Civil Service Act 1993 (PNDCL 327). GIPC ir.parliament.gh new-ndpc-static1.s3.amazonaws.com Natlex
• Nigeria — Labour Act, Cap L1 LFN 2004; Federal Public Service Rules (2008/2021). Laws of Nigeria OAGF OAGF
• Kenya — Employment Act 2007; Public Service Commission Act 2017. Kenya Law Natlex Kenya Law Kenya Law
• South Africa — Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997; Public Service Act 1994. Government of South Africa Saflii dpsa.gov.za Government of South Africa

Note: The DWA recognises the CSA regime by reference to the Civil Service Agency Act in Chapter 66 of the Executive Law; harmonisation proposals above are framed to respect that statutory separation while raising protections within the public service to the nationally accepted baseline.